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Discussion Report
by
Janine Oelkers*
The final discussion focused on the presentations by James D. Cox and
Randall S. Thomas. Arad Reisberg from London opened the discussion by
addressing the issue of class actions. Cox and Thomas, who examined a sample
of 53 settlements of institutionally filed claims, had made clear in their
presentations that class actions are less desirable due to high agency costs.
Investors only use the threat of the class action to obtain coerced settlements.
Reisberg therefore questioned whether a government agency should partic-
ipate in a class action as is the case according to Israeli law. Earlier, in his
presentation, Reisberg had explained that the Israeli Financial Market
Authority can join in a class action if it deems it to be in the public’s best
interest. Furthermore, Reisberg suggested that there was a lack of public
enforcement and so questioned whether this was a result of underfunding of
the SEC. Both Thomas and Cox replied. According to Thomas, notwith-
standing that, like most government bodies, the SEC could benefit from more
funding, the SEC remains an efficient and effective agency working well to
enforce law. Thomas asserted that the threat of securities fraud class actions
serves as a deterrent to persons considering committing fraudulent acts.
Furthermore, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) contains
a lead plaintiff provision ensuring that a class representative has a substantial
financial interest in the case; it is particularly designed to induce public
pension funds to participate in this capacity. Still, few institutional investors
are willing to appear as a lead plaintiff. Generally, institutional investors do so
only, in cases with higher provable losses and with larger defendant
companies. Cox concluded the discussion by adding that the access to
liability is mainly a political issue, noting that in 1985 class action reform was
halted due to political opposition. Today more than ever we need to re-
examine the issue of liability of accounting firms and underwriters, as well as
of directors.
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